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We examine the relationship between asymmetric information and the cost of 
going public for equity carve-outs (ECOs) as compared to ordinary initial 
public offerings (IPOs). We decompose underpricing into the opportunity cost 
of issuance (OCI) and a measure of share retention. Compared to an average 
IPO, we find that ECOs have lower OCI and price revisions, but higher share 
retention and long-term returns. Compared to a matched sample of IPOs, how-
ever, we observe similar OCI and long-term returns, but still find ECOs have 
higher share retention. Our analysis suggests that documented pricing differ-
ences between ECOs and IPOs likely are attributable to the characteristics of 
ECO firms and not necessarily to status as a carve-out.  
Introduction 
Existing studies examine the pricing of subsidiaries that are spun off from a par-
ent firm via an initial public offering, i.e., an equity carve-out (ECO). The results of 
these studies generally indicate that ECOs are easier to price (possibly a function of 
reduced information asymmetry) and therefore exhibit a lower degree of initial return 
(or underpricing). Unfortunately, these studies generally exhibit two potential flaws. 
First, they typically fail to properly control for unique characteristics of ECOs that 
also may impact pricing differences. For example, ECOs are generally much larger 
in terms of offering proceeds, which also may reduce pricing volatility.  
Second, most, if not all, existing studies concentrate on underpricing; however, 
recent evidence suggests that this measure may be biased as a measure of comparing 
issuance costs, particularly when existing shareholders retain a large portion of the 
stock. If parent firms of ECOs generally retain more (or fewer) shares, a comparison 
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of underpricing to other IPOs may be problematic. The goal of this study is to 
address these two deficiencies. 
To control for characteristics of ECO firms, we extend existing work by creating 
a sample of traditional (i.e., non-ECO) IPOs that are matched by issue date, SIC 
code, and offer size to 358 ECOs over the 1990-2000 period. In addition, rather than 
concentrating explicitly on underpricing, we also examine the opportunity cost of 
issuance (OCI), which effectively controls for differences in the level of share reten-
tion by preexisting owners. We also study the difference in offer price revisions and 
long-run returns, which may give us further evidence of potential differences 
between ECOs and ordinary IPOs. 
We find in univariate tests that ECOs have lower underpricing, lower opportu-
nity costs of issuance, smaller price revisions prior to the offering, and higher long-
run market-adjusted returns compared to a broad based sample of IPOs. In addition, 
we find that ECOs have lower underpricing, less price revision, and higher share 
retention compared to our matched sample. The univariate results highlight the 
importance of the measure of the cost of going public and also underscore the 
importance of the selection of a control sample to evaluate the similarities and differ-
ences between ECOs and other IPOs. For example, we find that ECOs are much 
larger, older, and less likely to be backed by venture capitalists compared to both the 
broad-based and matched samples.  
After controlling for a broad array of issue characteristics in multivariate tests, 
we find that the level of underpricing is not further explained by the designation of 
the offering as an ECO for either the broad-based or matched samples. Because the 
matching procedure eliminates many of the differences in potential proxies for 
information asymmetry, we also observe similar opportunity costs of issuance for 
ECOs and the matched sample. We still find, however, that ECOs have higher share 
retention compared to the matched sample. 
Our results broaden the understanding of ECOs, illustrating that reduced asym-
metry does reduce the cost of going public, as measured by both OCI and 
underpricing, at least as compared to an average IPO. This finding lends support to 
existing studies. Our matching analysis illustrates that most of these differences are 
attributable to the characteristics of ECO firms (e.g., size and industry) and not nec-
essarily to status as a carve-out.  
Equity Carve-Outs and Issue Costs 
An equity carve-out (ECO) is a special type of initial public offering (IPO) in 
which a parent company sells a portion of a subsidiary, or a division, to public share-
holders. Although objectives of the offerings may differ, ECOs and IPOs are 
generally similar in that both incur direct and indirect issuance costs. Direct issuance 
costs include the gross underwriting spread, auditing fees, lawyer fees, road show 
expenses, and printing expenses. Indirect issuance costs include lost management 
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time resulting from time spent dealing with regulatory compliance, answering bro-
kers’ and analysts’ calls, preparing shareholder reports, and so on.  
Another indirect issuance cost is the money left on the table (MLOT), which can 
be defined as the dollar change in the first-day price (price at end of day 1 minus 
offer price) multiplied by the number of shares issued. Typically, the money left on 
the table is the largest component of the total cost of going public. For example, 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that firms, on average, leave approximately $9.1 
million on the table, which is roughly twice the amount of direct fees paid. Hogan 
and Olson (2004) find that ECOs, whose average size is usually four times that of the 
typical IPO, leave an average of $19.35 million on the table.  
An ECO is generally different from other IPOs in terms of firm age, size, infor-
mation asymmetry, and managerial experience in dealing with investment bankers, 
analysts, and securities regulators. The parent companies of ECOs tend to be older 
and much larger than other IPO firms. Because the ECO was once part of a publicly 
traded firm that is required to continually supply the capital markets with informa-
tion, there may be less information asymmetry associated with ECOs relative to 
other IPOs, especially smaller ones and those with no public debt.  
Information Asymmetry and the Cost of Going Public 
Information asymmetry between the issuing firm and investors forms the basis 
of multiple theoretical models that have been posited to explain the large amount of 
money left on the table by issuing firms (e.g., Rock, 1986; Slovin, Sushka, and 
Ferraro, 1995; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; Hogan and Olson, 2004 and 2006; and 
Gleason, Madura, and Pennathur, 2005). Although the cause(s) of underpricing is 
(are) hotly debated, in theory the existence of asymmetric information may force 
issuers to offer shares at a discount as compensation for added pricing risk. This 
implies a positive relation between information asymmetry and the money left on the 
table and, consequently, the cost of going public. Prior studies generally address this 
relation by examining the level of underpricing, or initial return, on the first day of 
trading. The implication is that characteristics that reduce (increase) information 
asymmetry should be associated with lower (higher) underpricing. 
Underpricing, however, is only indirectly relevant as a measure of issuance cost. 
Possibly of more importance is the actual wealth lost by preexisting shareholders, 
which underpricing does not explicitly measure. Specifically, underpricing implicitly 
assumes that all preexisting shares are sold in the offering; however, the number of 
secondary shares retained (i.e., share overhang, defined as the number of shares 
retained by existing shareholders relative to the number of shares offered) may be 
large for certain issue types and/or in certain time periods, making underpricing par-
ticularly problematic for comparison purposes.  
Stated differently, only shares sold in the offering experience underpricing; 
retained shares do not. In fact, retained shares are valued at market and only 
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experience the dilution associated with the primary shares issued, typically a small 
amount relative to total firm equity value (particularly in more recent periods). For 
example, consider an extreme case in which a firm goes public by offering a single 
share. Obviously, any underpricing is economically irrelevant. More generally, firm 
owners typically retain a large portion of existing shares, implying that underpricing 
may, on average, substantially overstate the actual cost of issuance (wealth loss) to 
preexisting owners of the issuing firm. 
Barry (1989) addresses this relation, showing that the true wealth effect of an 
offering, in percent, (i.e., the opportunity cost of issuance, OCI) is given by: 
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
B
1B
B
r,B
B
B
B
s,o
P
PP
N
N
P
OPP
N
N
OCI  (1) 
The first term in brackets represents the percentage loss per share for preexisting 
shareholders that sell shares in the IPO. This loss is the difference between the per 
share pre-issuance value (PB) and the offer price (OP) as a percentage of the pre-
issuance value. As Barry (1989) illustrates, however, this measure is the OCI only if 
all original secondary shares are sold in the offering. The second term in brackets 
recognizes that for those shares retained, the loss is relative to the aftermarket price 
(P1), not the offer price. Thus, the total issuance opportunity cost is a weighted aver-
age of these two underpricing measures, where the weights are equal to the 
percentage of preexisting shares offered (i.e., secondary shares offered relative to the 
number of preexisting shares, No,s/NB) and the percentage of preexisting shares 
retained (i.e., the number of preexisting shares retained relative to the number of 
total preexisting shares, NB,r/NB), respectively.  
Following Barry (1989), Dolvin and Jordan (2006) extend the above result, 
illustrating that OCI can be simplified to the following equation that eliminates the 
unobservable pre-issuance price (PB) and allows OCI to be directly calculated: 
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No is the number of shares offered in the IPO; P1 is the market price at the end of the 
first trading day; OP is the offer price; NA is the number of shares after the offer; and 
No,p is the number of primary shares offered. The numerator is money left on the 
table, and the denominator is the value of preexisting equity immediately prior to the 
IPO.  
The difference between underpricing and OCI is determined by the level of 
share retention by preexisting owners, with higher share overhang leading to a 
smaller OCI relative to the level of underpricing. If the level of share overhang were 
constant across time and firms, then analyzing underpricing in the cross section 
would provide equivalent results to OCI. As illustrated by Loughran and Ritter 
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(2004) and Dolvin and Jordan (2006), however, share overhang varies significantly 
over time and across firms. Thus, OCI is likely a more accurate measure of the indi-
rect cost of equity issuance and, therefore, may be more appropriate for testing 
theories of information asymmetry than is underpricing. 
This difference may be particularly relevant for our analysis of equity carve-
outs. For example, parent firms may be encouraged to retain certain portions of 
carved-out firms in order to take advantage of favorable tax issues or for reporting 
purposes. (We briefly discuss this issue in a subsequent section.) Thus, it is possible 
that share overhang may be systematically different for equity carve-outs as opposed 
to traditional IPOs. If so, then analyzing underpricing to determine if the cost of 
going public differs between these two types of firms may be problematic, whereas 
OCI would not present such a difficulty. Moreover, because our sample period spans 
the bubble of 1999 to 2000, during which overhang values deviated significantly 
from historical averages, OCI likely will provide more accurate comparisons. As a 
result, we examine both underpricing and OCI in studying the relation between 
information asymmetry and the cost of going public for the special class of IPOs 
called ECOs. All studies on ECOs prior to this study focus only on underpricing, 
making this research a significant contribution to the literature. 
Comparison to Prior ECO Research 
Most prior studies on ECOs focus on returns from either the parent company’s 
or rival firm’s perspective at the time the carve-out is announced. Specifically, stud-
ies typically evaluate announcement returns in light of either the asymmetric 
information hypothesis (e.g., Nanda, 1991; Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro, 1995) or the 
divestiture gains hypotheses (e.g., Schipper and Smith, 1986; Lang, Poulsen, and 
Stulz, 1995; Allen and McConnell, 1998; Vijh, 1999; Hulbert, Miles, and Woolridge, 
2001; Vijh, 2002). These studies generally find evidence consistent with both 
hypotheses, concluding that gains occur as a result of revealing information to the 
market and/or by increased business focus, respectively. 
More recently, some studies have broadened the focus to include the perform-
ance of the carved-out firm. For example, Prezas, Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan (2000) 
compare the initial-day and long-term pricing performance of ECOs to a sample of 
other IPOs matched by size and book-to-market ratio for the period 1986 to 1995. 
The results show that ECOs exhibit significantly lower initial-day returns, but show 
no significant difference for the six-month and one-year buy-and-hold strategies. 
Prezas, Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan also find that initial underpricing is lower for 
issues represented by prestigious investment bankers.  
Hogan and Olson (2004, 2006) also focus on the performance of ECOs instead 
of the parent firm. Their results indicate that ECOs have been more willing to accept 
underpricing through time. They attribute the higher underpricing to an increased 
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importance of analyst coverage and the increased use of spinning, the practice where 
investment bankers allocate IPOs to high profile customers to garner future business. 
Although we follow Prezas, Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan (2000) and Hogan and 
Olson (2004, 2006) in examining the performance of the ECO rather than the parent 
firm, the present study differs in significant ways. As mentioned above, we give pri-
mary consideration to the true underlying opportunity cost of issuance (i.e., OCI) 
rather than focusing exclusively on underpricing, thereby controlling for any under-
lying relations associated with differential share retention decisions. Moreover, we 
explicitly compare ECOs to IPOs by selecting a sample of control firms that are 
similar with respect to industry, size, and issue date, using a six-month window 
rather than an entire issuance year as in Prezas, Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan. Our 
approach enables us to address the accuracy of the conclusions of previous studies, 
as well as to deepen the understanding of the differences between ECOs and more 
traditional IPOs. 
Definition Comparison 
As illustrated by the studies referenced above, the majority of the finance lit-
erature defines an equity carve-out as a sale of a subsidiary’s shares to the general 
public, and it is this definition that we follow. Unfortunately, many practitioners 
strictly define equity carve-outs as a partial spin-off in which the parent firm retains 
at least 80 percent of the outstanding stock, with the remaining shares sold to the 
general public.1  
Additionally, the finance literature generally considers a spin-off to be defined 
as a distribution of subsidiary shares to existing shareholders of the parent firm. 
Practitioners, however, consider spin-offs to be either from the distribution of shares 
to current shareholders or from a sale of the majority of the shares to the general 
public. Thus, from this perspective, our study encompasses both equity carve-outs 
and spin-offs; however, we retain the terminology employed by previous research 
studies by simply referring to these offering as equity carve-outs. Thus, our sample 
covers units carved-out by parent firms that sell any percentage (above or below 80 
percent) of the subsidiary to the general public by way of a public offering. 
The Decomposition of Underpricing 
Following Barry (1989), Dolvin and Jordan (2006) decompose the traditional 
definition of underpricing into the product of two components: the opportunity cost 
of issuance (OCI) and a measure of share retention called economic overhang. The 
model can be described as: 
                                                          
1This 80 percent is a significant ownership level in that it allows for continued consolidation of 
parent and carve-out for financial reporting purposes. It also creates tax advantages for subse-
quent spin-offs (divesting of shares to existing shareholders) of the subsidiary. 
Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting, Vol. 47, No. 3 9 
erhangEconomicOv*OCIP/)PP(ngUnderprici 001 =−=  
)]P*No/()N*P[(*)E/MLOT(ngUnderprici 0bb=   
where: 
P1 = Market price at the end of the first day of trading; 
P0 = Offer price; 
OCI = Opportunity cost of issuance = (MLOT)/E; 
MLOT = Money left on the table = No*(P1-P0); 
E = Preissuance total equity value = Pb*Nb; 
Pb = Equity value per share immediately prior to the offering; 
Nb = Number of shares prior to the offering; and 
No = Number of shares offered in the IPO. 
 
Although economic overhang (EconOver) is the theoretically correct measure of 
share retention in the OCI derivation, prior studies primarily concentrate on share 
overhang in empirical tests. This choice is a function of two principal issues. First, 
share overhang is the variable that is selected explicitly by preexisting managers (i.e., 
the choice variable), whereas economic overhang reflects the number of shares 
retained scaled by the price placed on the shares by the market, which is beyond the 
control of issuing firms. Second, the correlation between EconOver and ShareOver is 
significantly positive (0.77 in our sample), implying that results are generally 
consistent.  Therefore,  we  report  both measures in Table 1; however, we follow the  
 
Table 1—Summary Statistics 
 ECOs Matched All IPOs t-statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) v (2) (1) v (3) 
N 358 358 3,570   
Initial 14.54 20.96 27.07 -2.19 -6.08 
OCI 4.13 5.03 5.27 -1.38 -2.45 
EconOver 4.14 3.95 4.73 0.52 -1.90 
ShareOver 2.87 2.57 2.92 1.83 -0.36 
Revision 0.48 0.68 0.69 -1.79 -2.36 
BHRet3 -21.33 -39.67 -45.28 0.93 1.70 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for ECOs and IPOs (matched sample and full sample) for the 
1990 to 2000 period. Columns 1 through 3 report means, and the final two columns report t-statistics from 
difference tests assuming unequal variances. Initial is initial return, or underpricing, defined as the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. OCI is the opportunity 
cost of issuance, defined as money left on the table divided by preexisting equity value. EconOver is 
economic overhang, defined as preissuance equity value divided by the offering proceeds. ShareOver is 
share overhang, defined as the number of shares retained relative to the total number of shares issued. 
Revision is a measure of the price revision, defined as the offer price less the initial low filing price, 
divided by the difference between the initial high and low filing prices. BHRet3 is the cumulative buy-
and-hold, market adjusted abnormal return calculated from the end of the first trading day to three years 
later. Data are from the SDC New Issues and CRSP databases 
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typical convention and concentrate specifically on share overhang in our subsequent 
empirical tests, although we find in unreported results that our findings are consistent 
in either case. 
Functional Form of the Model  
A review of prior studies dealing with IPOs is helpful in identifying variables 
that have been shown to affect ECOs. Specifically, prior research on IPOs has identi-
fied several variables that can be used as proxies for information asymmetry and 
have been shown to explain returns in early trading. The variables include the pro-
ceeds of the offer, if the offer was backed by a venture capitalist, company age, if the 
offer is priced as an integer, if the company is high tech, if the company is an internet 
firm, if the company used a prestigious ranked underwriter, if there are only primary 
shares being offered, market movements prior to the offering, price revisions on the 
offer, and if the offer occurred during the bubble period (1999 to 2000).  
To examine the potential relationship that exists between asymmetric informa-
tion and the cost of going public for ECOs as compared to other IPOs, we regress 
five different dependent variables that are thought to reflect the level of information 
asymmetry on the above independent variables.2 The dependent variables include 
initial or first day return, the opportunity cost of issuance, share overhang, price revi-
sions before the offering, and the three year cumulative market-adjusted buy-and-
hold abnormal return. By specifying different dependent variables, we are able to 
better understand the potential relationship between asymmetric information and the 
cost of going public for ECOs relative to other IPOs.  
The functional form of the model can be specified as follows: 
 Depi =  α + β1ECO + β2LnProceeds + β3VC + β4LnAge 
+ β5Integer + β6HT + β7Internet + β8Rank 
+ β9Primary + β10NasLag + β11PartialU 
+ β12PartialD + β13Bubble + εI    (3) 
where: 
Depi = Dependent variable i;  
i = DepInitial, DepOCI, DepShareOver, DepRevision, or DepBHRet3; 
DepInitial = Initial return, or underpricing, defined as the percentage change from 
the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day; 
                                                          
2In unreported results, we also examined gross spread as a dependent variable as it also may 
reflect the degree of information asymmetry. We find that status as a carve-out is unrelated to 
spread, which would suggest that there is no difference in information asymmetry relative to a 
typical IPO. As a pricing variable (similar to a commission or fee based investment account), 
however, it is possible that spread is indirectly related to information asymmetry via offer size, 
as larger accounts typically pay a smaller relative percentage. To examine this issue, we repeat 
the regression without the proceeds variable, finding that carve-out status is highly significant.  
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DepOCI = The opportunity cost of issuance, defined as money left on the table 
divided by preexisting equity value;  
DepShareOver = Share overhang, defined as the number of shares retained relative to 
the total number of shares issued; 
DepRevision = A measure of the price revision, defined as the offer price less the 
initial low filing price, divided by the difference between the initial 
high and low filing prices; 
DepBHRet3 = The cumulative buy-and-hold, market adjusted abnormal return cal-
culated from the end of the first trading day to three years later; 
ECO = A dummy variable equal to one if the issue is an equity carve-out, 
zero otherwise; 
LnProceeds = Natural logarithm of the gross proceeds of the issue in millions of 
dollars; 
VC = A dummy variable equal to one if the issue is backed by a venture 
capitalist, zero otherwise; 
LnAge = Natural logarithm of one plus the age of the issuing firm in years at 
the time of the offering; 
Integer = A dummy variable equal to one if the offer price is an integer, zero 
otherwise; 
HT = A dummy variable equal to one if the issue is a high-technology (but 
non-internet) firm, zero otherwise; 
Internet = A dummy variable equal to one if the firm is an internet firm, zero 
otherwise; 
Rank = The quality rank of the lead underwriter as given by Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004); 
Primary = A dummy variable equal to one if the offering is a pure primary 
offering (i.e., no secondary shares), zero otherwise; 
NasLag = The return on the Nasdaq composite index for the 15 trading days 
prior to the issue; 
PartialU = The percentage change from the original midfile price to the offer 
price if the adjustment is positive, zero otherwise; 
PartialD = The percentage change from the original midfile price to the offer 
price if the adjustment is negative, zero otherwise; and 
Bubble = A dummy variable equal to one if the offer takes place in the 1999 to 
2000 period.3 
                                                          
3Although market returns rose prior to 1999 and peaked in March 2000, falling thereafter, we 
follow the majority of previous IPO studies with our definition of bubble. Although we ana-
lyze alternative definitions (finding no significant changes to our results), we maintain this 
definition for consistency and also to reflect the timing lag associated with IPO issues relative 
to actual market returns. 
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Data  
The sample of ECOs is chosen based upon the following criteria:  
• Information on all public corporate initial public offerings (IPOs) 
flagged as spin-offs to public shareholders are obtained from Thom-
son’s SDC Platinum New Issues database during the period January 1, 
1990 through December 31, 2000.4 In addition, we use the CRSP data-
base for the same period to obtain data for shares outstanding on the 
issue date as well as pricing information.5 
• Information on all other IPOs is also generated for the same time period 
from SDC. 
• Common stock issues only; no multiple securities issues such as stocks 
with warrants, or stocks and bonds issued together. 
• Public issues only, i.e., no private offerings. 
Our working sample contains 358 ECOs entering the IPO market over the time 
period of our study. These data are matched with a working sample of 3,570 IPOs to 
create an additional sample of 358 IPOs matched by industry, issue date, and size.6 
Specifically, for each ECO, an IPO is chosen that is within the same two-digit SIC 
code, issued in a six month period around the ECO and is as close to the offering size 
of the ECO as possible. 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for firms undertaking ECOs, a matched 
sample of IPOs, and the full sample of IPOs for the 1990 to 2000 period. Columns 
one through three report means, and the final two columns report t-statistics from 
difference tests assuming unequal variances for the variables. According to the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, the initial returns for ECOs should be less than 
those of IPOs. Table 1 depicts an average initial return for ECOs of 14.54 percent 
compared to 20.96 percent for the matched sample IPOs and 27.07 percent for the 
full sample IPOs. These initial returns are significantly different at the five percent 
and one percent levels, respectively. The returns for ECOs are also less than the IPO 
returns reported by Loughran and Ritter (2004) who find an average first day return 
                                                          
4Note that SDC’s terminology of spin-off is consistent with the research definition of equity 
carve-outs that we employ in this study. Specifically, SDC defines spin-offs as shares sold to 
the public by a parent firm who holds between 50 percent and 100 percent of the outstanding 
shares prior to the offering, giving no weight to the percentage of shares actually being sold.  
5SDC is known to contain data errors, so we correct our information using data provided by 
Jay Ritter (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm).  
6The three most widely studied factors for examining long-run returns are market conditions, 
size, and book-to-market. Our approach indirectly covers each of these factors. Specifically, in 
examining long-run returns, we do so on a market-adjusted basis. Moreover, our matching 
criteria are based on both size and industry, the latter of which is highly correlated to book-to-
market ratios. 
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of 18.9 percent for a sample of 6,169 IPOs during the period 1980 to 2000. The 
results support the asymmetric information hypothesis and the results of Prezas, 
Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan (2000) and Hogan and Olson (2004, 2006) that show 
ECOs are significantly less underpriced than typical IPOs. As discussed previously, 
however, these findings may be biased by a failure to control for the share retention 
decision. 
OCI can be viewed as the true opportunity cost (i.e., wealth loss) of going public 
to the pre-issue shareholders of the firm because it accounts for the number (and 
value) of shares retained. ECOs have a mean OCI of 4.13 percent, which is signifi-
cantly less at the five percent level than the full IPO sample with OCI costs 
averaging 5.27 percent. These results imply that whether costs are being measured 
by the difference in underpricing or by using the opportunity cost of issuance, the 
costs of going public for ECOs are significantly less than the costs of going public 
for an average IPO. The results for the matched sample IPOs also show larger OCI 
of 5.03 percent, but it is not significantly different from the ECOs’ 4.13 percent. 
Thus, while underpricing is shown to be statistically different for the ECOs and the 
matched sample, the opportunity costs of issuance are not. Shareholders of ECOs 
and the matched sample leave comparable amounts of money on the table. The 
results highlight the importance of the measure of the cost of going public and the 
selection of a control sample, two factors existing ECO research typically ignores. 
An outcome of an IPO is that the percentage of insider ownership is expected to 
decrease. A measure of ownership dilution developed by Bradley and Jordan (2002) 
is share overhang, the ratio of retained shares to the public float (the shares issued in 
the IPO). Several hypotheses have been postulated to explain the relationship 
between first day returns and share overhang for IPOs. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) argue that the opportunity cost of underpricing to issuers is less if the relative 
float is small and is greater for pre-issue shareholders who sell shares than for those 
who retain their shares.  
The asymmetric information hypothesis contends that the relative float can be 
viewed as a signal of firm value. Managers with positive information about the pros-
pects of the firm will signal this value by selling only a small fraction of the firm. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) find a positive relationship between share overhang and 
first day returns for IPOs. These theories really relate to OCI, however, not under-
pricing. In fact, testing the theories could be problematic. For example, the signaling 
model mentioned above suggests that increased retention would be a positive sign to 
potential shareholders, thereby resulting in a reduced cost of going public. But this 
decision also increases overhang. Thus, the effect on underpricing could be positive 
or negative. This again illustrates the importance of decomposing underpricing. 
In Table 1, we find share overhang values of 2.87, 2.57, and 2.92 for ECOs, the 
matched sample, and the full sample, respectively. The share overhang value for 
ECOs is significantly larger at the ten percent level when compared to the matched 
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sample but not significantly different when compared to the full sample. These 
results imply that IPOs when matched for industry, issue date, and size have insiders 
selling off more of the firm than do the parents of ECOs. These findings are consis-
tent with the differences in OCI and Initial observed above. 
In Table 1, price revision is defined as the offer price less the initial low filing 
price, divided by the difference between the initial high and low filing prices. 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) find a positive rela-
tionship between price revisions and the level of underpricing as measured by initial 
return. Hogan and Olson (2004) find a similar relationship over time for initial 
returns for ECOs and conclude that their results suggest an increasing importance of 
price revisions before the offering as a signal of the initial demand and performance 
of ECOs.  
We find price revision values of 0.48, 0.68, and 0.69 for ECOs, the matched 
sample, and the full sample, respectively. The price revision value for ECOs is sig-
nificantly less at the ten percent level when compared to the matched sample and at 
the five percent level when compared to the full sample. The lower price revisions 
for ECOs are consistent with lower information asymmetry, as well as the lower 
underpricing of the offer.  
We measure long-run return in Table 1 as the cumulative buy-and-hold, market-
adjusted abnormal return calculated from the end of the first trading day to three 
years later.7 The summary results show that all IPOs, including ECOs, have negative 
long-run returns, which is consistent with the findings of Ritter (1991). We find 
three-year cumulative buy-and-hold, market-adjusted returns of -21.33 percent, 
-39.67 percent, and -45.28 percent for the ECOs, matched sample, and full sample, 
respectively. The negative returns are consistent with the view of IPOs as fad 
investments. The long-run return for ECOs shows a significantly smaller loss at the 
ten percent level when compared to the full sample but not significantly different 
when compared to the matched sample. The results suggest that ECOs have the eco-
nomic advantage when looking at long-run performance; when adjusting for firm-
specific characteristics, however, there does not appear to be any long-run perform-
ance differences between ECOs and IPOs. These results support those of Prezas, 
Tarimcilar, and Vasudevan (2000) who find no significant difference between their 
sample of ECOs and an IPO match for six-month to a one-year holding period.  
Table 2 looks at firm and issue characteristics for ECOs, the matched sample, 
and full sample of IPOs over the 1990 to 2000 period. We find mean size of the 
offering as measured by gross proceeds as $210.25, $98.43, and $52.26 million for 
the ECOs, matched sample, and full sample, respectively. The ECOs are signifi-
cantly larger at the one percent level than the full and matched samples. Although 
one of the categories we use to match samples of ECOs and IPOs is size, our 
                                                          
7For the market return we use the CRSP value-weighted index. 
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matched sample is less than half the size of ECOs.8 The results highlight an impor-
tant distinction between ECOs and IPOs in that ECOs are fundamentally larger than 
other IPOs. To the extent that size can be used as a proxy for information asymme-
try, ECOs will have less information asymmetry than other IPOs and should have 
less underpricing; however, a larger size implies a higher OCI, which is a result of 
the firm representing a larger economic risk to the market. Our results are consistent 
with Hogan and Olson (2000) who find an inverse relationship between the size of 
the offering and first-day excess returns. 
In Table 2, we find that 13 percent, 38 percent, and 47 percent of the ECOs, 
matched sample, and full sample, respectively, are backed by venture capitalists. The 
ECOs use significantly fewer venture capitalists at the one percent level than the 
matched and full samples. Given the size and experience of the parent firm in dealing 
with the capital markets, ECOs become much less reliant on venture capitalists rela-
tive to other IPOs. In addition, ECOs do not have a great need for external seed 
capital, as the parent firm can most likely provide the needed financing. 
We find an average age of 17.68, 13.11, and 10.48 years for the ECOs, matched 
sample, and full sample, respectively. The ECOs are significantly older at the one 
percent level than the matched and full samples. To the extent that the length of time 
that a firm is in existence can be used as a proxy for information asymmetry, our 
results suggest that ECOs have lower asymmetry. 
We also find in Table 2 a significant difference between ECOs and the full sam-
ple of IPOs with regard to whether the offer price is an integer, whether the deal 
involves a high technology or Internet firm, the rank of the underwriter, whether the 
issue is a pure primary offering, market movements for the 15-day period prior to the 
offering, whether there is positive price adjustment prior to the offering, and whether 
the issue occurred during the 1999 to 2000 bubble period. It is interesting to note that 
once we match by industry, date, and size, these variables are no longer significantly 
different. To the extent that these variables can be used as proxies for information 
asymmetry, it will be possible to explain some of the differences in underpricing and 
the costs of going public between ECOs and IPOs. Also interesting is the significant 
difference between the negative price adjustment of -7.35 percent for ECOs and 
-5.57 percent for the matched sample of IPOs. The results imply that with less 
information asymmetry bad news will hit the ECO harder than the matched sample 
IPO. 
                                                          
8As a robustness check, we match in a different order, starting with size. The reason for the 
matching scheme reported is the relatively large scale of carve-outs. Specifically, over our 
sample period seven of the largest ten (and 15 of the largest 25) IPOs are carve-outs. So, 
matching by size potentially may create a time bias, as finding a similar-sized IPO within a 
given time period is difficult. Further, determining the exact size difference to allow is also 
subjective. Thus, we choose to match in the order presented, as we believe this is the most 
objective, particularly considering that the size difference is present in either approach. 
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Table 2—Firm and Issue Characteristics 
 ECOs Matched All IPOs t-statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) v (2) (1) v (3) 
n 358 358 3,570   
Proceeds 210.25 98.43 52.26 3.03 12.65 
VC 0.13 0.38 0.47 -7.86 -17.28 
Age 17.68 13.11 10.48 2.78 5.55 
Integer 0.74 0.75 0.80 -0.26 -2.51 
HT 0.18 0.21 0.33 -0.95 -6.75 
Internet 0.06 0.07 0.12 -0.30 -4.48 
Rank 7.71 7.59 6.91 0.84 7.14 
Primary 0.56 0.54 0.63 0.68 -2.43 
NasLag 0.77 1.15 1.19 -1.13 -1.67 
PartialU 7.78 9.08 9.96 -1.06 -2.50 
PartialD -7.35 -5.57 -6.97 -2.25 -0.61 
Bubble 0.14 0.15 0.21 -0.64 -3.84 
Note: This table reports firm and offer characteristics for ECOs and IPOs (matched sample and full 
sample) for the 1990 to 2000 period. Columns 1 through 3 report means, and the final two columns report 
t-statistics from difference tests assuming unequal variances. Proceeds is the gross proceeds of the issue in 
millions of dollars. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is backed by a venture capitalist, zero 
otherwise. Age is the age of the issuing firm in years at the time of the offering. Integer is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the offer price is an integer, zero otherwise. HT is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the issue is a high-technology (but non-internet) firm, zero otherwise. Internet is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm is an internet firm, zero otherwise. Rank is the quality rank of the lead underwriter 
as given by Carter and Manaster (1990) and updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Primary is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the offering is a pure primary offering (i.e., no secondary shares), zero otherwise. 
NasLag is the return on the Nasdaq composite index for the 15 trading days prior to the issue. PartialU is 
the percentage change from the original midfile price to the offer price if the adjustment is positive, zero 
otherwise. PartialD is the percentage change from the original midfile price to the offer price if the 
adjustment is negative, zero otherwise. Bubble is a dummy variable equal to one if the offer takes place in 
the 1999 to 2000 period. Data are from the SDC New Issues and CRSP databases 
Regression Results Full Sample 
Table 3 presents the results of the regressions using the model specified by 
equation (3) on the full sample of ECOs and IPOs. By specifying five different 
dependent variables we are able to gain better insight into the level of information 
asymmetry and the cost of going public for ECOs relative to other IPOs. There are 
3,826 observations for the Initial, OCI, share overhang, and three year buy-hold 
return models and 3,486 observations for the price revision model. We find adjusted 
R2 values of 47.54 percent, 9.54 percent, 28.32 percent, 23.05 percent, and 4.68 per-
cent for the initial, OCI, share overhang, price revision, and three year buy-hold 
return full sample models, respectively. 
Regression Results for the First Day Return (Initial) Model 
The initial column in Table 3 reports the regression results for the full sample 
when the dependent model specified by equation (3) is measured as the initial 
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return.9 We find that initial returns are significantly negatively related at the one 
percent level to the size of the offer and significantly positively related at the one 
percent level to the offer price being an integer, the deal being an internet company, 
the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the offering, the price revisions up and 
down prior to the offering, and if the offer is undertaken during the bubble period. 
The coefficients for whether the deal is high tech and the underwriter’s ranking are 
positive and significant at the five percent level, and the coefficient for whether the 
deal includes only primary shares is positive and significant at the ten percent level. 
Whether the issue is backed by a venture capitalist and the age of the firm are not 
significant variables in explaining initial returns. These results are consistent with the 
results of Loughran and Ritter (2004) for IPOs and Hogan and Olson (2004, 2006) 
for ECOs.  
 
Table 3—Regression Results (Full Sample) 
 Initial OCI ShareOver Revision BHRet3 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 10.65 3.34 6.58 9.86 1.12 7.47 -1.33 -9.64 -34.94 -1.34
ECO -1.88 -0.85 -0.86 -1.88 0.20 1.97 -0.40 -4.52 42.67 2.38
LnProceeds -4.06 -4.37 0.35 1.78 -0.18 -4.14 0.61 16.56 -26.59 -3.51
VC 0.77 0.56 -0.66 -2.31 -0.07 -1.04 0.19 3.43 79.38 7.16
LnAge -0.91 -1.36 -0.34 -2.44 -0.07 -2.33 -0.06 -2.30 16.26 3.01
Integer 3.98 2.60 0.58 1.80 -0.06 -0.81 0.07 1.11 17.88 1.44
HT 2.47 1.75 0.31 1.06 0.52 7.91 0.42 7.41 -22.89 -1.99
Internet 19.09 7.76 -0.28 -0.55 1.13 9.83 1.27 13.22 84.43 4.22
Rank 0.96 2.39 -0.32 -3.75 0.23 11.99 -0.07 -4.40 8.31 2.54
Primary 2.40 1.82 -0.13 -0.47 0.67 10.90 0.15 -2.88 -19.89 -1.85
NasLag 0.90 7.31 0.13 4.97 -0.03 -5.77 0.05 10.32 -2.35 -2.35
PartialU 1.37 36.46 0.07 8.32 0.02 12.17 -0.07 -0.21
PartialD 0.26 4.70 0.12 10.57 -0.00 -1.42 0.24 0.51
Bubble 22.47 11.58 0.38 0.93 0.87 9.59 0.04 0.48 -140.64 -8.91
N 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,486 3,826 
Adj R2 .4754 .0954 .2832 .2305 .0468 
Note: This table presents regression results from estimating the following model on the full sample of 
ECOs and IPOs:  
Depi =  α + β1ECO + β2LnProceeds + β3VC + β4LnAge + β5Integer + β6HT + β7Internet 
+ β8Rank+ β9Primary + β10NasLag + β11PartialU + β12PartialD + β13Bubble + εi   
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either Initial, OCI, ShareOver, Revision, or BHRet3. These 
dependent variables are defined in Table 1. ECO is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is a carve-
out, zero otherwise, and all independent variables are defined in Table 2. Data are from the SDC New 
Issues and CRSP databases for the 1990 to 2000 period 
                                                          
9To check for multicollinearity we ran a simple correlation matrix, finding that the highest 
correlation (0.20) was between the carve-out dummy and the size (lnproceeds) of the offering. 
All others were even smaller. Consistent with this, the VIF value was largest (2.61) for the 
size variable in the initial return regression. With the exception of underwriter rank, all others 
were well below 2.0. Thus, all variable passed the test for multicollinearity between the vari-
ables. 
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The coefficient for ECOs is negative but not significant in this regression, 
implying that when control variables are introduced the designation of whether the 
issue is an ECO does not further explain underpricing, which is in contrast to the 
results of previous studies. From Table 2, we find that ECOs are significantly larger 
than the full sample of IPOs and have significantly fewer offering prices that are 
integers, fewer high technology firms, fewer internet firms, use more prestigious 
investment bankers, less upward price revisions, and fewer offerings during the bub-
ble period. These variables, which can be viewed as proxies for information 
asymmetry, appear to capture the differences between ECOs and other IPOs.  
Regression Results for  
Opportunity Cost of Issuance (OCI) Model 
The OCI column in Table 3 reports the regression results for the full sample 
when the dependent model specified by equation (3) is measured as the opportunity 
cost of issuance. We find that OCI is significantly negatively related at the five per-
cent level to whether the issue is backed by a venture capitalist, the age of the firm, 
and the prestige of the investment banker. OCI is significantly positively related at 
the one percent level to the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the offering, and up 
and down price revisions and at the ten percent level for the size of the offering and 
whether the offer price is an integer. OCI is not explained by the deal being high 
tech, an internet deal, primary shares only, or if it was issued during the bubble 
period. 
If ECOs have less information asymmetry, it is expected that they would have a 
lower opportunity cost of issuance because firms, relative to their size, would need to 
leave less money on the table. The coefficient for the ECO variable is negative and 
significant at the seven percent level, implying that ECOs have a lower opportunity 
cost of issuance compared to the full sample of IPOs. The results suggest that even 
after controlling for firm characteristics, ECOs leave less money on the table. As 
shown in Table 2, ECOs are usually older and are more likely to have been through 
the IPO process before and thus are more likely to use a high ranking investment 
banker and also more likely to exert their market power to control costs and leave 
less money on the table.  
Regression Results for Share Overhang (ShareOver) Model 
The ShareOver column in Table 3 reports the regression results for the full sam-
ple when the dependent model specified by equation (3) is measured as share 
overhang. We find that share overhang is significantly negatively related at the one 
percent level to the size of the offering and the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to 
the offering and at the five percent level to the age of the firm. Share overhang is 
significantly positively related at the one percent level to whether the deal is high 
tech, whether it’s an internet deal, the ranking of the investment banker, when the 
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issue includes only primary shares, positive price revisions prior to the offering, and 
if the issuance date occurred during the bubble period. Share overhang is not 
explained by whether the issue is backed by a venture capitalist, downward price 
revisions, or whether the offer price is an integer.  
The coefficient for ECOs is positive and significant at the five percent level, 
thus implying that ECOs are related to higher levels of share overhang and thus less 
ownership dilution, which may be a function of the desire to maintain a sufficient 
ownership level to capture tax and reporting advantages. The combination of reduced 
asymmetric information and the firm’s insiders selling-off a smaller percentage of 
the firm may be seen by the market as a signal that the insiders feel the firm is a good 
investment. The insignificant coefficient for ECOs in the initial model can be 
explained by the offsetting effects of the significantly lower OCI and significantly 
higher share overhang for ECOs that are observed in the OCI and ShareOver models.  
Regression Results for the Price Revision (Revision) Model 
The revision column in Table 3 reports the regression results for the full sample 
when the dependent model specified by equation (3) is measured as price revision. 
We find price revision is negatively related at the one percent level to the rank of the 
investment banker and whether the issue includes only primary shares and at the five 
percent level to the age of the firm. We find price revision is positively related at the 
one percent level to the size of the offering, the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to 
the date of issuance, and whether the deal is high tech, internet, or backed by a ven-
ture capitalist. Except for the size variable, the results are consistent with the 
information asymmetry hypothesis and the expected cost of going public. Price revi-
sion is not explained by whether the offer price is an integer or if the issue occurred 
during the bubble period. 
The coefficient for the ECO variable is negative and significant at the one per-
cent level, implying that deals labeled as ECOs will see less price revision associated 
with its offer price prior to the date of issuance. The result is consistent with lower 
information asymmetry and a reduced cost of going public for ECOs relative to the 
full sample of IPOs.  
Regression Results for  
Long-Run Buy-and-Hold Strategy (BHRet3) Model 
The BHRet3 column in Table 3 reports the regression results for the full sample 
when the dependent model specified by equation (3) is measured by the long-run, 
market-adjusted return, defined as the cumulative buy-and-hold, market-adjusted 
return calculated from the end of the first trading day to three years later. We find 
that long-run, market-adjusted returns are positively related at the one percent level 
to the age of the firm, whether the issue is backed by venture capitalists, and whether 
the deal involves an internet firm and related at the five percent level to the prestige 
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of the investment banker. We find long-run, market-adjusted returns are negatively 
related at the one percent level to the size of the firm and if the deal occurred during 
the bubble period, at the five percent level to the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior 
to the date of issuance, and at the ten percent level to deals involving only primary 
shares. Long-run returns are not explained by whether the offer price is an integer or 
by up and down price revisions prior to the offering. 
The coefficient for ECOs is positive and significant at the five percent level, 
suggesting that ECOs do significantly better in the long run compared to the full 
sample of IPOs. The results could be a function of ECOs having lower indirect issu-
ance costs that are incurred after a firm becomes public. These indirect costs include 
management time devoted to regulatory compliance, answering brokers' and ana-
lysts’ calls, preparing shareholder meetings and reports, and so on. Through the 
parent company, ECOs have more experienced management in dealing with these 
indirect costs relative to other IPOs, and as a result, more time can be devoted to the 
operations of the firm.  
The higher long-run returns for ECOs also could be a function of the lower ini-
tial returns that ECOs have been shown to exhibit. With the significantly lower 
initial return, as shown in Table 1, there would be less overreaction in price and thus 
fewer swings in price in the long run. In unreported results, however, we include 
Initial in the regression and find that ECO remains positive and significant in pre-
dicting long-run returns.  
Regression Results for Matched Sample 
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions using the model specified by 
equation (3) on the matched sample of ECOs and IPOs. All columns and variables 
are comparable for the full sample results reported in Table 3. There are 706 obser-
vations for the Initial, OCI, share overhang, and three year buy-and-hold return 
models and 668 observations for the price revision model. We find adjusted R2 val-
ues of 46.78 percent, 7.98 percent, 23.46 percent, 18.33 percent, and 1.78 percent for 
the Initial, OCI, share overhang, price revision, and three year buy-and-hold return 
matched-sample models, respectively.  
Regression Results for the  
Matched Sample First Day Return (Initial) Model  
For the Initial model, the results for the matched sample are comparable to those 
for the full sample except that deals when the offer price is an integer and when the 
issue includes only primary shares are no longer significant. First day returns con-
tinue to be negatively related to size and positively related to the deal being an 
internet company, the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the offering, the price 
revisions up and down prior to the offering, if the offer is undertaken during the bub-
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ble period, whether the deal is high tech, and the prestige of the underwriter. 
Consistent with the results of Table 3, the coefficient for ECOs is not significant. 
 
Table 4—Regression Results (Matched Sample) 
 Initial OCI ShareOver Revision BHRet3 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 11.81 2.09 4.77 3.21 0.53 1.39 -0.54 -1.95 -58.62 -1.18
ECO -1.09 -0.47 -0.26 -0.43 0.27 1.72 -0.25 -2.41 13.91 0.68
LnProceeds -5.54 -4.28 0.45 1.33 -0.15 -1.69 0.32 5.34 12.90 1.13
VC 1.94 0.72 0.31 0.44 -0.39 -2.09 0.08 0.67 60.22 2.53
LnAge -0.16 -0.16 -0.21 -0.81 -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -1.46 12.43 1.43
Integer 4.21 1.65 -0.47 -0.71 0.12 0.70 0.06 0.55 44.61 1.99
HT 5.68 1.98 0.93 1.23 1.03 5.30 0.38 2.86 -5.48 -0.22
Internet 33.91 6.06 -1.06 -0.72 1.11 2.91 1.35 5.38 58.32 1.18
Rank 1.77 2.35 -0.20 -0.99 0.21 4.07 -0.05 -1.29 -10.57 -1.59
Primary -0.76 -0.34 0.39 0.66 0.97 6.34 0.18 1.68 -0.26 -0.01
NasLag 0.67 2.57 0.13 1.89 -0.03 -1.89 0.05 4.11 -2.40 -1.05
PartialU 1.04 13.12 0.06 2.68 0.03 4.96 -1.18 -1.69
PartialD 0.27 2.44 0.15 5.13 0.00 0.27 0.15 0.16
Bubble 19.41 5.05 0.93 0.93 0.89 3.40 0.25 1.43 -85.85 -2.54
N 706 706 706 668 706 
Adj R2 .4678 .0798 0.2346 .1833 .0178 
Note: This table presents regression results from estimating the following model on the full sample of 
Carve-outs and the matched sample of IPOs:  
Depi =  α + β1ECO + β2LnProceeds + β3VC + β4LnAge + β5Integer + β6HT + β7Internet 
+ β8Rank + β9Primary + β10NasLag + β11PartialU + β12PartialD + β13Bubble + εi   
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either Initial, OCI, ShareOver, Revision, or BHRet3. These 
dependent variables are defined in Table 1. ECO is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is a carve-
out, zero otherwise, and all independent variables are defined in Table 2. Data are from the SDC New 
Issues and CRSP databases for the 1990 to 2000 period 
Regression Results for the  
Matched Sample Opportunity Cost of Issuance (OCI) Model 
For the OCI model, the results for the matched sample are much different than 
those for the full sample. We find that OCI is no longer significantly negatively 
related to whether the issue is backed by a venture capitalist, the age of the firm, and 
the prestige of the investment banker and no longer significantly positively related to 
the size of the offering and whether the offer price is an integer. Of greatest impor-
tance to this study, we also find the coefficient for ECOs is no longer significant. 
These results suggest that the opportunity cost of issuance for ECOs is similar to 
IPOs of similar size, in the same industry, and issued around the same time. Only the 
15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the offering (10 percent level), and up and 
down price revisions remain positive and significantly related to the opportunity cost 
of issuance for the matched sample. 10  
                                                          
10An alternative hypothesis as to any differences in issue costs relates to the goals of each issue type. For 
example, issuing firms of ECOs may be primarily interested in divesting ownership control, and, in con-
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Regression Results for the  
Matched Sample Share Overhang (ShareOver) Model 
The results for the matched sample for the ShareOver model are comparable to 
those for the full sample, except that the coefficient for the venture capitalist variable 
is now significantly negative at the five percent level and the age of the firm is no 
longer significant. We find that share overhang is negatively related to the size of the 
offering and the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the offering and significantly 
positively related to whether the deal is high tech, whether it’s an internet deal, the 
ranking of the investment banker, when the issue includes only primary shares, posi-
tive price revisions prior to the offering, and if the issuance date occurred during the 
bubble period.  
The coefficient for ECOs is positive and significant at the ten percent level, 
implying that the insiders for ECOs tend to retain more shares than do IPOs of firms 
in the same industry issuing around the same time. Thus, even though the OCI is 
similar for ECOs and matched firms, there still exists a difference in the share reten-
tion for ECOs. Shareholders of ECOs experience less share dilution relative to IPOs 
in the same industry. These results imply that the determinants of share overhang do 
not change much, even when the sample is matched with like firms. 
Regression Results for the  
Matched Sample Price Revision (Revision) Model 
The results for the matched sample for the Revision model are comparable to 
those for the full sample, except that coefficients for the venture capitalist, the age of 
the firm, and the ranking of the underwriter variables are no longer significant in 
explaining price revisions prior to the offering. We find price revision is positively 
related to the size of the offering, the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the date of 
issuance, whether the deal is high tech or internet, and when the issue includes only 
primary shares. Price revisions for ECOs still appear to be lower than for similar 
IPOs. This supports the hypothesis that with less information asymmetry, there is 
less overreaction in price for the ECOs prior to the offering even when compared to 
IPOs in the same industry issuing securities around the same time.  
Regression Results for the Matched Sample  
Long-Run Buy-and-Hold Strategy (BHRet3) Model 
For the long-run return model, the results for the matched sample are much dif-
ferent than those for the full sample. We find that long-run, market-adjusted returns 
                                                                                                                                         
trast, IPO issuers may be most concerned about liquidity creation and maintaining control. The lack of 
significance, however, suggests that these differences have little, if any, effect. Moreover, considering our 
matching criteria and the reduction in significance from the whole sample to the matched samples, it 
appears that any difference is driven by asymmetry.  
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are no longer significantly positively related to the age of the firm, whether the deal 
involves an internet firm, and the prestige of the investment banker and no longer 
negatively related to the size of the firm, if the deal occurred during the bubble 
period, the 15-day return on the Nasdaq prior to the date of issuance, and to deals 
involving only primary shares. Long-run returns continue to be positively explained 
by whether the issue is backed by venture capitalists and negatively related to the 
bubble period. We also find that the coefficient for whether the offer price is an inte-
ger is now significant and positive at the five percent level, whereas it was not 
significant for the full sample.  
The long term results do not support any difference in returns for carve-outs 
when matched with IPO firms having the same characteristics, suggesting that larger 
IPO firms do better than smaller ones. These results support those of Prezas, Tarim-
cilar, and Vasudevan (2000) who find no significant difference between a set of 
ECOs and a matched IPO sample after one year of issuance. The results also support 
Gleason, Madura, and Pennathur (2005), who find ECO firms that are reacquired by 
the parent firm due to poor performance in the long run tend to be smaller than the 
carve-out firms that are not reacquired. 
Robustness Tests 
To this point, we have found that ECOs are systematically different from typical 
IPOs in terms of size, age, and other factors. Failing to control for these factors, 
similar to prior studies, suggests that ECOs face lower issue costs as a result of 
reduced information asymmetry. Controlling for these factors via a matching 
approach eliminates much of this significance, suggesting that status as a carve-out is 
less significant than previously thought. Rather, it is the underlying characteristics of 
such firms that are important. 
To provide additional confidence in our results, we conduct a series of robust-
ness tests where we segment our sample by time period, as prior IPO studies 
generally find that results are often dependent on time period.11 Although we attempt 
to control for this impact via our Bubble dummy, we formally address this issue by 
examining multiple subperiods of our matched sample within the 1990-2000 sample. 
For conciseness, we report results for Initial and OCI in Table 5, although our find-
ings for the other dependent variables are generally consistent.  
 
                                                          
11To further address time period dependence, we considered extending the sample period; however, we 
found that there were relatively few carve-outs in the incremental surrounding years. For example, during 
2001-2004 there were only 29 carve outs. Rather than complicating and lengthening the paper for what we 
feel is little marginal benefit, we have decided to exclude these from the analysis, as the lack of data may 
also make the results less meaningful. We do find, however,  that inclusion of such issues does not materi-
ally affect our overall results.  
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Table 5—Regression Results (Matched Sample by Time Period) 
Panel A—Bubble vs. Non-Bubble. 
 Initial OCI 
 Non-Bubble Bubble Non-Bubble Bubble 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 10.15 3.15 45.33 0.91 4.59 3.29 15.67 1.98
ECO -0.19 -0.14 -2.65 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 2.73 1.10
LnProceeds -3.27 -4.19 -14.35 -2.02 -0.00 -0.00 2.13 1.89
VC -0.68 -0.43 16.66 0.88 0.14 0.21 4.97 1.66
LnAge -0.05 -0.09 -0.60 -0.08 -0.12 -0.50 -1.66 -1.42
Integer 4.27 3.00 -5.96 -0.26 0.27 0.44 -11.99 -3.32
HT 4.97 2.99 12.15 0.65 -0.10 -0.14 9.61 3.25
Internet 33.73 6.34 14.90 0.80 -0.12 -0.08 3.19 1.08
Rank 1.34 3.10 6.91 1.09 -0.02 -0.11 -1.34 -1.33
Primary -0.65 -0.50 -11.00 -0.69 -0.12 -0.21 0.28 0.11
NasLag 0.59 3.26 0.43 0.44 0.33 4.19 -0.34 -2.21
PartialU 0.42 6.86 1.55 5.85 0.07 2.51 0.04 0.92
PartialD 0.35 5.55 1.13 1.42 0.13 4.83 0.27 2.14
N 604 102 604 102 
Adj R2 .2694 .4447 .0908 .2387 
 
Panel B—1990-1995 vs. 1996-2000 
 Initial OCI 
 1990-1995 1996-2000 1990-1995 1996-2000 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 10.73 3.47 18.34 0.97 4.20 3.80 11.94 2.56 
ECO -0.33 -0.24 -2.10 -0.34 0.28 0.58 -0.78 -0.52 
LnProceeds -3.32 -4.15 -5.79 -1.91 -0.25 -0.87 1.25 1.68 
VC -1.58 -1.00 7.76 1.07 0.23 0.40 0.46 0.26 
LnAge 0.18 0.32 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.81 -1.24 
Integer 3.42 2.41 4.97 0.69 0.31 0.62 -2.52 -1.42 
HT 5.24 2.83 3.83 0.57 0.43 0.65 0.78 0.47 
Internet 12.74 1.32 32.18 3.60 0.61 0.18 -1.63 -0.74 
Rank 1.35 3.18 1.57 0.67 0.04 0.25 -0.98 -1.70 
Primary -1.61 -1.23 -0.74 -0.13 -0.49 -1.05 1.64 1.13 
NasLag 0.34 1.71 0.43 0.86 0.19 2.71 0.06 0.51 
PartialU 0.36 5.75 1.44 9.55 0.09 3.95 0.04 1.05 
PartialD 0.34 5.23 0.38 1.31 0.12 4.95 0.23 3.25 
N 450 256 450 256 
Adj R2 .2081 .4719 .1277 .0531 
Note: This table presents regression results, segmented by time period, from estimating the following 
model on the full sample of Carve-outs and the matched sample of IPOs:  
Depi =  α + β1ECO + β2LnProceeds + β3VC + β4LnAge + β5Integer + β6HT + β7Internet 
+ β8Rank + β9Primary + β10NasLag + β11PartialU + β12PartialD + εi   
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either OCI, Revision, or BHRet3. Panel A examines the 
Bubble period (1999-2000) versus the non-bubble period (1990-1998), and Panel B examines 1990-1995 
versus 1996-2000. These dependent variables are defined in Table 1. ECO is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the issue is a carve-out, zero otherwise, and all independent variables are defined in Table 2. Data 
are from the SDC New Issues and CRSP databases for the 1990 to 2000 period 
 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that many of the variables exhibit a sig-
nificant degree of time period dependence. For example, offer size is positively and 
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significantly related to OCI in the latter half of the decade (whether defined as 1996-
2000 or the bubble period), but not prior. In addition, underwriter quality and high 
technology/internet status has a positive impact on underpricing in the non-bubble 
period, but not thereafter.  
Of importance to our study, however, we find that status as a carve-out does not 
gain or lose significance across time. Particularly for underpricing, the significance 
levels remain relatively constant (e.g., -0.14 and -0.17, respectively, in the non-bub-
ble and bubble periods). For OCI, the significance levels are not as consistent, but a 
difference test reveals that there is no significant difference between the impacts in 
either the non-bubble and bubble periods or the 1990-1995 and 1996-2000 periods. 
Thus, our results appear to be robust to varying time periods within our sample. 
Conclusions 
Similar to other IPOs, ECOs incur direct and indirect issuance costs. The largest 
component of the costs of going public typically has been the money left on the table 
(MLOT), defined as the dollar change in the first day price (price at end of day 1 
minus offer price) times the number of shares offered. Information asymmetry forces 
issuers to offer shares at a discount, thus suggesting a positive relation between 
information asymmetry and MLOT. Prior research has examined the relation 
between information asymmetry and the cost of going public by examining the level 
of underpricing, defined as the initial return on the first day of trading. 
Dolvin and Jordan (2006) decompose the level of underpricing into the product 
of two components: the opportunity cost of issuance (OCI), defined as the money left 
on the table (MLOT) divided by the pre-issue equity value, and a measure of share 
overhang or retention (called economic overhang), defined as the ratio of the pre-
issue equity value divided by the gross proceeds of the offering. They demonstrate 
that the traditional measure of underpricing introduces a bias into our understanding 
of the pricing of IPOs in that it fails to consider the share retention decision. By fail-
ing to do so, they show that the true cost of going public to the pre-issue shareholders 
will be overstated when measured by initial returns. 
In this paper, we examine the cost of going public for 358 ECOs during the 1990 
to 2000 period and compare these results to a broad-based sample of 3,570 IPOs and 
to a matched sample of 358 IPOs. The matched sample is selected based upon 
industry, issue date, and size of the offering. We find in univariate tests that ECOs 
have lower underpricing, lower opportunity costs of issuance, fewer price revisions 
prior to the offering, and higher long-run market-adjusted returns compared to a 
broad-based sample of IPOs. In addition, we find that ECOs have lower underpric-
ing, less price revision, and higher share retention compared to a matched sample. 
The univariate results highlight the importance of the measure of the cost of going 
public: the level of underpricing or the opportunity cost of issuance.  
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The results also highlight the importance of the selection of a control sample to 
evaluate the similarities and differences between ECOs and other IPOs. We find that 
ECOs are much larger, older, and less likely to be backed by venture capitalists 
compared to both the broad-based and matched samples. We note that, despite trying 
to match by size, ECOs are still more than twice the size of the matched sample. 
When compared to the broad-based sample, we find that ECOs have fewer issues 
that are priced as integers, fewer high technology firms, fewer internet firms, use a 
higher ranked investment banker, have fewer pure primary offerings, observe fewer 
market movements prior to the offering, have fewer upward price revisions, and 
fewer issues offered during the bubble period. When compared to the matched IPO 
sample, however, we find that these proxies for information asymmetry are no longer 
significantly different.  
After controlling for the above proxies for information asymmetry in multivari-
ate tests, we find that the level of underpricing is not further explained by the 
designation of the offering as an ECO for either the broad based or matched samples. 
Decomposing underpricing into the opportunity cost of issuance and share overhang, 
however, we find differences between ECOs and IPOs. Consistent with information 
asymmetry, we find that ECOs have lower opportunity costs of issuance and higher 
share retention compared to the broad-based sample. The insignificant role for ECOs 
in explaining underpricing using the broad-based sample can be explained by the 
lower opportunity costs of issuance offsetting the higher share retention. Because the 
matching procedure eliminates many of the differences in the proxies for information 
asymmetry, we observe similar opportunity costs of issuance for ECOs and the 
matched sample. We still find that ECOs have higher share retention compared to the 
matched sample. 
Our results broaden the understanding of ECOs, illustrating that reduced asym-
metry does reduce the cost of going public, as measured by both OCI and 
underpricing, at least as compared to an average IPO. This finding lends support to 
existing studies. Our matching analysis illustrates that most of these differences are 
attributable to the characteristics of ECO firms (e.g., size and industry) and not nec-
essarily to status as a carve-out, however. 
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